



Odsjek za filozofiju i
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Hrvatsko društvo za analitičku filozofiju



Pozivamo Vas na predavanja

Profesor Michael Devitt

(Distinguished Professor na City University of New York)

koja će se održati

Ponedjeljak, 16. rujna 2024. u 17:00, uč. F-401

“CHANGING OUR LOGIC: A QUINEAN PERSPECTIVE”

Can we change our logic and if so how? According to Kripke and Padró’s Adoption Problem, we cannot, on the basis of accepting a basic logical principle like universal instantiation (UI), adopt the practice of reasoning by UI. We advance a naturalistic Quinean response, resisting the philosophical tendency to over-intellectualize our cognitive processes. We answer two questions about changing our logic. Can someone rationally accept a new basic logical principle? We suggest an empirical solution. Can someone, on the basis of accepting a new basic logical principle, rationally change her inferential practices? Those practices are cognitive skills, so we look to the psychology of skills. ‘Declarative knowledge’ of any skill, including that of inferring by UI, could help acquire the ‘procedural knowledge’ of the skill only by yielding the instructions used in ‘explicit learning’ to train in the skill. But we find, surprisingly, that a person could not *train herself* to UI; to that extent the Adoption Problem is real. Nevertheless, there is a solution: it is rational to hire a coach to gain any skill, including to UI. In this way, a person could rationally change her inferential practices on the basis of accepting the UI-principle.

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“OSTRICH NOMINALISM”

“Ostrich Nominalism” is Armstrong’s (1978) pejorative name for the Quinean response to the venerable One over Many problem. Instead of offering a solution to this problem, as do Realists and traditional Nominalists, the Ostrich dismisses the problem as pseudo. The paper discusses the early responses to Armstrong, particularly Devitt (1980) and Lewis (1983). These responded to Armstrong’s request for ontological commitment. The paper then turns to Armstrong’s request for “truthmakers”, a request that has dominated later discussions. Truthmaking is standardly understood semantically as a version of the correspondence theory, but it can be understood metaphysically. Understood semantically, the Ostrich dismisses Armstrong’s request as a misguided attempt to derive a metaphysics from a semantics. Understood metaphysically, as a demand for “groundings”, the Ostrich is again dismissive: this is another bit of unnatural metaphysics. The paper defends this dismissiveness in discussing Rodriguez-Pereyra (2000, 2005). Finally, the paper considers Imaguire’s Priority Nominalism (2018).